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INTRODUCTION
This Essay encapsulates and expands on my comments at the February 
2011 Symposium “Sovereignty in Today’s World” organized by the 
Michigan State International Law Review. 
As explored by my fellow speakers, economic globalization is 
challenging for the large economies of the world. It is even more 
challenging for the smaller economies of the world, such as those in the 
Caribbean. I will discuss some illustrative challenges to economic 
sovereignty, how the Caribbean has responded to these challenges—what 
have been the effects—and offer some analysis of the implications to the 
economic sovereignty of Caribbean states and territories.  
∗ Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law—Indianapolis. The Author 
is grateful to the editors of the International Law Review of the Michigan State University 
College of Law for the opportunity to participate in its 2011 symposium, Sovereignty in 
Today’s World. Research work by Steve Jorgenson, JD expected 2012, Indiana University 
School of Law—Indianapolis (expected 2011) provided valuable contributions to this 
project. Ruth Lilly Law Library Research Librarian Debra Denslaw and the reference staff of 
the Ruth Lilly Law Library were an invaluable resource.  
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My remarks will explore the following subjects:  
1. The meaning of sovereignty in the context of small 
and micro states in the current iteration of 
globalization 
2. Economic globalization presents strong challenges 
to the economic sovereignty of Caribbean states 
and territories. 
3. The challenges, and their impact on the Caribbean, 
offer a narrative perspective and an analytical path 
that is relevant to larger states and economies. 
My remarks are organized as follow: Part I offers a working definition of 
economic sovereignty; Part II consists of an illustrative list of challenges to 
Caribbean economic sovereignty, and descriptions of Caribbean states’ and 
territories’ responses to those challenges; Part III provides an analysis of 
implications for Caribbean economic sovereignty and contemporary 
economic sovereignty of states in general; and my concluding statements 
are in Part IV. 
I. WHAT IS ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY?
As so well articulated by Professor Dunoff earlier in the symposium, 
there is a great deal of discussion and debate regarding the definition and 
implications of sovereignty, and I am not going to create a new definition: 
The working definition that I have used for my remarks is: The power of an 
individual state to act independently—to choose and craft economic tools to 
serve the best interests of the state’s domestic economy (as such interests 
are perceived by and/or pursuant to the vision and judgment of the people 
and government of that state).  
I also thought that it would be meaningful to specify what I mean when I 
refer to “the Caribbean.” Some potential for ambiguity is present since the 
Caribbean Sea is bordered by several countries located in mainland North, 
South, and Central America, including Mexico, Venezuela, and the United 
States. In my remarks I am referring to islands that are both independent 
states and overseas dependent territories in the Caribbean Basin.1 The nation 
states include Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, and the Dominican Republic. 
The overseas dependent territories include entities affiliated with the United 
Kingdom (for example, the British Virgin Islands, Anguilla, the Turks and 
Caicos Islands, and the Cayman Islands); France (Martinique, Guadeloupe, 
and St. Barthelemy); The Netherlands (St. Eustatius and Saba); and the 
United States (Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands). 
1. See, e.g., Peter Clegg, Governing the UK Caribbean Overseas Territories: A 
Two-Way Perspective, in GOVERNANCE IN THE NON-INDEPENDENT CARIBBEAN: CHALLENGES 
AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Peter Clegg & Emilio Pantojas-Garcia 
eds., 2009). 
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Like other island chains colonized by European powers (the island 
chains of the Pacific offer another such example), the Caribbean provides a 
wonderful experimental and experiential laboratory of the different types or 
models of sovereignty and quasi-sovereignty extant in the contemporary 
world. Looking at a map of the Caribbean, one might see a depiction of the 
history of the New World as it was discovered and colonized by European 
powers. It is due to that history that, today, the Caribbean has these varied 
languages. For example, the United Kingdom has the British Virgin Islands, 
Montserrat, and Anguilla.2 You also see French departements: That is, when 
you step on the shores of Martinique and Guadalupe, you are in France. The 
same is true in St. Barts because, according to the French conception of 
France, the departements are essential parts of France—they’re all French. 
In another example, St. Maarten recently attained the status of an 
independent country within the Kingdom of The Netherlands; and Anguilla, 
the Turks and Caicos Islands, and the British Virgin Islands are overseas 
dependent territories of the United Kingdom, with particular levels of 
independence and autonomy. Then we have the Dutch Islands: St. Maartens, 
St. Eustasius, Curacao, Aruba.  You will think of some Caribbean states and 
territories as vacation spots, great for Spring break which is coming up 
within the next month. And, of course, the United States also is present with 
Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands.  
As there are several varieties of sovereignty and different stages of self-
determination in the overseas dependent territories, states, departements, in 
the Caribbean, no individual territory finds its situation replicated in 
another. Each has its own deal with its former colonizer—that is, former 
mother country. In addition, however, we have islands, such as Jamaica, 
such as Trinidad, such as Barbados, and so on, that are independent states 
and are attempting to make their way in this new era of globalization, of 193 
countries, or 192 until Southern Sudan becomes independent. So, in the 
Caribbean, you will see that there are states, nation states—members of the 
UN—such as Jamaica, Barbados, Trinidad, Antigua, as well as other 
entities, overseas dependent territories.  
What does it mean: “Overseas dependent territories?”  In the context of 
the Caribbean, the descriptor includes the islands which are not sovereign 
states, as they have not secured independence from their colonizers.  As 
 2. And I have an illustrative story with respect to Anguilla. That is, in the 1970s or 
80s, the British wanted to get rid of Anguilla, so they put forward the proposition that 
Anguilla should be governed from St. Kitts and Nevis. Now, the Anguillans—and if you’ve 
been to Anguilla, it’s a sandbar basically, beautiful colored beaches and all that—they 
revolted and asked to be put back under the jurisdiction of the United Kingdom. So they 
continued to be an overseas dependent territory of the United Kingdom, instead of joining St. 
Kitts and Nevis, a twin island nation state. 
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such, they “have surrendered aspects of their political, economic and 
cultural identities to external centres of power.”3
Now, these jurisdictions, to the extent that they are independent, are 
members of the World Trade Organization. In addition, there is a primarily 
Anglophone community, a regional grouping called CARICOM: the 
community of Caribbean states. This was supposed to be a regional pooling 
of sovereignty to create a counterbalance to economic pressures coming 
from outside the region.4
I would like to take this opportunity to acknowledge the potential limits 
of my perspective and to admit that I am an Anglophone in the context of 
the Caribbean because, as you may know, in the Caribbean you will speak 
of the Anglophone, Francophone, Spanish and Dutch speaking islands and 
territories. My interests and analysis have focused mostly on the 
Anglophone Caribbean, with some references to the Francophone and 
Spanish speaking entities. 
Within these definitional and affinity constraints, I will now address 
some particular examples of challenges to Caribbean economic sovereignty 
and my analysis of their broader implications.  
II. ILLUSTRATIVE CHALLENGES TO CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY
My remarks will focus on the recent illustrative challenges listed below: 
A. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) anti-tax haven initiative; 
B. The OECD-Financial Action Task Force (FATF) 
anti-money laundering initiative; 
C. The United States-European Union (EU) World 
Trade Organization (WTO) banana dispute; 
D. The termination of European Union sugar subsidies 
pursuant to WTO rules; 
E. The Antigua-United States WTO internet gambling 
dispute; and 
F. The EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership 
Agreement 
 3. Peter Clegg and Emilio Pantojas-Garcia, Preface, in GOVERNANCE IN THE NON-
INDEPENDENT CARIBBEAN: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 
supra note 3, at xvii.  The authors describe the territories’ dissatisfaction with the status quo,
despite, or perhaps because, independence does not appear to be a viable option for these 
small islands and island chains.  Id.
 4. See Karen E. Bravo, CARICOM, the Myth of Sovereignty, and Aspirational 
Economic Integration, 31 N.C. J. INT’L. L. & COM. REG. 145, 155-60 (2005) [hereinafter 
Bravo, CARICOM]. 
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A. OECD Anti-Tax Haven Initiative 
Beginning in 2001, the OECD initiated negotiations with countries it 
considered to be tax havens, meaning that the tax regulations and structures 
of those economies were unfair and illegal according to the criteria 
introduced by the OECD.5 The organization also began an initiative to list 
and target states, which it claimed, or which, according to its standards, 
were tax havens. The OECD used leverage and threats to try to get countries 
to make significant tax reforms and essentially bullied countries into 
making such changes.6 The designation of a jurisdiction as a “tax haven” 
depended on the OECD’s determination that the favorable tax treatment 
offered by the jurisdiction in question was luring money and taxpayers from 
other, “more honest” jurisdictions. It is noteworthy that the “other, more 
honest” jurisdictions that suffered the allegedly negative effects were 
Western-oriented, wealthier countries. That is, more favorable tax treatment 
was given to taxpayers leaving the United States, the European Union, and 
other jurisdictions to invest their money in the alleged tax havens. 
In this regard, we must now scrutinize the OECD. Now what is the 
OECD? It is the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. 
Who are the member states of that organization? They are the states with the 
largest economies in the world. 
The organization is an exclusive club, composed of the 34 states with the 
world’s largest economies.7 The membership is almost exclusively Western 
 5. The OECD considers countries that, in their opinion, offer tax rates that are low 
enough to be considered nominal to be tax havens, which allow taxpayers  to evade their 
domestic tax authorities. OECD, HARMFUL TAX COMPETITION: AN EMERGING GLOBAL ISSUE
32 (1998). In fact, the OECD labels a country a tax haven if: (1) it imposes no or only 
nominal taxes; (2) it offers a lack of transparency about the application of tax laws and about 
underlying documentation; (3) it has laws or administrative practices that prevent the 
effective exchange of information for tax purposes with other governments about taxpayers 
who benefit from zero or nominal taxation; (4) the absence of a requirement that the 
taxpayer’s activity within the country’s jurisdiction be substantial. Samantha H. Scavron, 
Note, In Pursuit of Offshore Tax Evaders: The Increased Importance of International 
Cooperation in Tax Treaty Negotiations after United States v. UBS AG, 9 CARDOZO PUB. L.
POL’Y & ETHICS J. 157, 165-66 (2010). 
 6. Taylor Morgan Hoffman, Development, The Future of Offshore Tax Havens, 2 
CHI. J. INT’L L. 511, 512 (2001). The actions taken by the OECD have been characterized as 
“economic imperialism” whereby large, powerful states exert their will over small offshore 
jurisdictions that threaten the financial dominance of the world powers. Richard K. Gordon, 
On the Use and Abuse of Standards for Law: Global Governance and Offshore Financial 
Centers, 88 N.C. L. REV. 501, 534-35 (2010). Gordon contends that there has been a shift 
from state actors directly implementing their global governance agendas to international 
bodies controlled by the world powers essentially serving as a proxy to direct and implement 
the agendas and restrict the growth of developing economies. Id. at 506-08.  
 7. For a complete list of the OECD’s membership, see OECD, List of OECD 
Member Countries-Ratification of the Convention on the OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/document/58/0,3746,en_2649_201185_1889402_1_1_1_1,00.html (last 
visited October 31, 2011). 
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and European, with the exception of Chile, Japan, Korea, Turkey, Mexico, 
and Israel. No African, Pacific, or Caribbean states are represented. The 
organization excludes the voices of the world’s other 160 states. The 
composition and authority of the OECD is not representative. That is, it is 
not a universal membership body; instead, its membership is limited to 
economies of a certain size. There was no democratic participation in 
standard-setting by the territories and countries listed as tax havens.8 The 
OECD listed a number of Caribbean entities in its offshore tax haven 
report.9 Among the Caribbean states and territories included in the list were: 
Antigua, Barbados, The Bahamas, The Cayman Islands, The Turks and 
Caicos Islands, and the twin island nation of St. Kitts and Nevis. The list 
included overseas dependent territories as well as nation states. Each of 
these entities had begun the process of successfully diversifying their 
economies from agriculture into financial and other service sectors. 
There was great uproar. The response in the Caribbean was to 
characterize the listing and resulting economic pressures as discriminatory 
economic blackmail.10 The effect of the blacklist was severe:11 Immediate 
results were that multinationals—banking and financial entities—
 8. One author critiques the OECD for trying to impose its will on states that are not 
even OECD members and for encroaching on the sovereignty of nations. See Alexander 
Townsend Jr., The Global Schoolyard Bully: The Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development’s Coercive Efforts to Control Tax Competition, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J.
215, 215 (2001). Townsend asserts that telling states how they must form and implement 
their tax policies is a serious threat to the sovereignty of nations. Id. at 220-21. He also notes 
that the OECD is telling these sovereign nations how they need to decide their fiscal needs, 
and how they are to decide their fiscal needs. Id. at 219-20. 
9. See OECD, TOWARDS GLOBAL TAX CO-OPERATION: PROGRESS IN IDENTIFYING 
AND ELIMINATING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICE 17 (2000), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/9/61/2090192.pdf. 
10. See OECD Tax List Called “Economic Blackmail,” ALLBUSINESS.COM, (Aug. 1, 
2000), http://www.allbusiness.com/finance/581057-1.html [hereinafter Economic 
Blackmail]. 
 11. The OECD has clearly impacted the financial sectors of Caribbean nations and 
territories. Diane Ring, Who is Making International Tax Policy?: International 
Organizations as Power Players in a High Stakes World, 22 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 649, 710-
11 (2010). In addition, the United States has unilaterally set its sights on Caribbean nations 
with growing financial sectors as well. The United States has strayed from the OECD’s 
model for addressing such issues and employed a number of tactics to discourage the use of 
Caribbean banks, including subjecting people and organizations to audits for simply 
transacting with offshore Caribbean financial institutions. Bruce Zagaris, The Procedural 
Aspects of U.S. Tax Policy Towards Developing Countries: Too Many Sticks and No 
Carrots?, 35 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 331, 336 (2003). As the United States continues to 
see greater deficits in the budget, it is increasingly likely that it will put even more pressures 
on anyone that uses Caribbean banking facilities. Id. at 390. The events of September 11, 
2001 is used as a justification for the necessity of preventing countries from having 
preferential taxing and banking practices. See Bruce Zagaris, Revisiting Novel Approaches to 
Combating the Financing of Crime, 50 VILL. L. REV. 509, 511 (2005). See generally Elwood 
Sanders Jr. & George Sanders, The Effect of the USA Patriot Act on the Money Laundering 
and Currency Transaction Laws, 4 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 47 (2004). 
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announced that they would exit these countries and territories and the 
targeted states and territories feared negative reputational effects would take 
place. In addition, there was uncertainty regarding the enforcement action 
that the member states of the OECD might take if their multinational 
corporations (MNC’s)  did not exit the Caribbean states.  
So, as I said, that initiative began in 2000, and by 2009 most or actually 
all countries and territories were off the blacklist.12 We still have now a gray 
list.13 The gray list is a group of countries that said “yes, we will accede to 
your demands.” But, the OECD says: “Well, you’re not carrying it out in as 
quick a fashion, you’re not implementing these commitments as we would 
like.” So now several Caribbean countries are on the gray list of potential 
tax havens.14
B. OECD/FATF: Anti-Money Laundering Initiative 
In 2003, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s 
(OECD) Financial Action Task Force (FATF) issued a new revision of its 
Forty Recommendations, which had been first issued in 1990 and which 
form the baseline standards for the international prevention of and fight 
against money laundering by banking and financial systems and institutions. 
That same year, the FATF issued a list of Non-Cooperating Territories and 
Countries (the NCCT list), naming countries whose banking and financial 
laws and regulations did not meet the standards set forth in the updated 
Forty Recommendations.  
The purpose of the Financial Action Tax Force is anti-money laundering 
activities: that is, the perception that monies were being transferred around 
the world in a sub rosa fashion by drug traffickers, corrupt governments, 
and corrupt private parties, and were being facilitated by the banking system 
in particular countries.15 Prior to the issuance of the NCCT list in 2003, in 
 12. At the G-7 meeting in July of 2007, the world powers’ Finance Ministers agreed 
that sanctions they called “defensive measures” would be placed upon uncooperative tax 
havens. Hoffman, supra note 5, at 512. The Caribbean countries were originally encouraged 
by the British in the 1960s to diversify their economies by creating financial sectors; the 
sectors have since grown to the point that they made up as much as a quarter of some 
countries’ economies. Id. at 512-13. The United States’ stance is that the offshore accounts 
were accounting for $70 billion a year in lost tax revenue. Id. at 513. 
13. See Ulrich Eder, The Caribbean, The OECD and The Empty Black List,
31CARIBBEAN PROPERTY MAGAZINE (Aug. 2009), 
http://www.caribpro.com/Caribbean_Property_Magazine/index.php?pageid=717. 
 14. These include Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, and the Cayman Islands, among 
others. Id.
 15. For a thorough discussion of the initiative, see Karen E. Bravo, Follow the 
Money? Does the International Fight Against Money Laundering Provide A Model for 
International Anti-Human Trafficking Efforts?, 6 ST. THOMAS L.J. 138, 160-66, 173-79 
(2008). Those considered to be countries that support or allow money laundering are often 
depicted as countries run by greedy, selfish bureaucrats who simply want money and do not 
care whether they are giving terrorist organizations and criminals a place to carry out their 
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February 2000, the FATF had published the Report on Non-Cooperative 
Countries and Territories (the Initial 2000 NCCT Report) and, in three 
subsequent reports, identified countries and territories that it would 
investigate and review in order to determine NCCT designation. The list 
included 15 countries and territories. Similarly to the anti-tax haven 
initiative, several Caribbean states and territories were included on the list. 
By late 2007, when the FATF issued the 2006/2007 list of Non-Cooperating 
Territories and Countries, no jurisdictions remained on the list—all the 
formerly non-compliant states and territories are now compliant or their 
compliance was in the process of being confirmed. That is, within eight 
years, all the territories identified as an NCCT, or potential NCCT, had 
taken steps comply with the standards of the Forty Recommendations, had 
been investigated and/or monitored, and were de-listed.16
The non-cooperative countries and territories (NCCTs) initiative was 
created to ensure that all countries adopt anti-money laundering measures.17
Once again, the non-representative nature of the membership of the 
international organization that is the source of the rule making, monitoring, 
and sanctioning is striking. The FATF is an independent inter-governmental 
organization created by the G-7/OECD in 1989. As with the tax haven 
initiative, the standards were formulated by a non-representative body—that 
is, no input from the countries that would be subject to those standards. The 
project was intended to force non-member states and jurisdictions with 
deficient anti-money laundering systems to create new legislation by 
adopting a “name-and-shame” device—in the form of the published list of 
non-compliant jurisdictions—and by encouraging FATF members to take 
actions to convince NCCTs of the importance of adopting such legislation.  
The criteria for identifying NCCTs consist of a range of detrimental rules 
and practices in and by a country or territory that obstruct international 
cooperation against money laundering. These detrimental rules can be found 
in a NCCT’s financial and other regulatory requirements (especially those 
related to identification), their rules regarding international administrative 
and judicial cooperation, and the resources the country has made available 
illegal activities on an international scale. See William F. Wechsler, Follow the Money, 80 
FOREIGN AFF. 41, 41-43 (2001). Countries that choose to respect the privacy of their 
investors are seen as safe havens for those wishing to conduct illegal money laundering 
activities, despite the reality that such privacy is likely to be just as appreciated by those that 
do not have any illegal intentions. Id. at 42. The inherent assumption that the alleged money 
laundering havens merely intend to service criminals fails to take into account that many of 
the states with laws favorable to investors are created to give them some sort of a general 
competitive advantage in the financial sector that they would not otherwise have with 
uniform laws. Shawn Turner, U.S. Anti-Money Laundering Regulations: An Economic 
Approach to Cyberlaundering, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1389, 1399-1400 (2004).   
16. See Bravo, supra note 15, at 160-66. 
 17. Jared Wessel, The Financial Action Task Force: A Study in Balancing 
Sovereignty with Equality in Global Administrative Law, 13 WIDENER L. REV. 169, 174
(2006).  
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for preventing, detecting, and repressing money laundering.18 There is no 
specific criterion that can serve as a litmus test; rather, a jurisdiction should 
be judged based on the entirety of its efforts to combat money laundering.  
Also noteworthy is the intrusive and very effective nature of the 
monitoring imposed, under threat of sanctions, on non-FATF and non-
OECD states.19 For the most part, Caribbean countries have complied with 
the regulations established regarding money laundering, but they have had 
to do so because if they did not, economic disaster would result—their 
economies simply are not strong enough to survive for long while under 
siege from the world powers.20 What does it mean? Sovereign states are 
subject to intrusive monitoring by the FATF and have changed their internal 
regulations in order to comply with the standards issued from above, 
without their participation, that is, from the OECD.21
C. WTO: United States-European Union Banana Dispute 
Let us address now challenges with respect to the trade in goods. None 
of the Caribbean states or territories are members of the OECD or of the 
FATF. This non-membership contrasts with their status in the World Trade 
Organization. The Caribbean states are members of the WTO; in fact, they 
are founding members because they had been members of the GATT.22
18. Id.
 19. For example, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF) was 
established in 1996 and received a great deal of criticism from both sides of the issue. PETER 
REUTER & EDWIN M. TRUMAN, CHASING DIRTY MONEY: THE FIGHT AGAINST MONEY 
LAUNDERING 84 (2004). One of the primary problems with the CFATF is that it exercises 
peer review of members and does some global supervision, but has little to no power to 
require compliance with sanctions. Id. at 85. After 9/11, the United States has tried to correct 
these flaws in implementation. Id.
 20. G. Scott Dowling, Comment, Fatal Broadside: The Demise of Caribbean 
Offshore Financial Confidentiality Post USA PATRIOT Act, 17 TRANSNAT’L L. 259, 292
(2004).The broad wording of the PATRIOT Act gives the U.S. a number of weapons in its 
arsenal to change the financial practices of Caribbean countries indefinitely. Id. at 292-93. 
The Bahamas and the Cayman Islands have been two of the more “cooperative” Caribbean 
jurisdictions, and foreign states often make requests for information regarding certain clients; 
more often than not, the requests are honored. Evan Metaxatos, Thunder in Paradise: The 
Interplay of Broadening United States Anti-Money Laundering Legislation and 
Jurisprudence with the Caribbean Law Governing Offshore Asset Preservation Trusts, 40 U.
MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 169, 188-89 (2008). 
 21. Critics have argued that the FATF’s actions are a form of interference and an 
impingement on the sovereignty of the nations targeted by the FATF, and that sanctions, if 
imposed, would be a violation of the UN Charter because such measures are supposed to be 
addressed by the UN Security Council. Todd Doyle, Note, Cleaning up Anti-Money 
Laundering Strategies: Current FATF Tactics Needlessly Violate International Law, 24 
HOUS. J. INT’L L. 279, 300-301 (2001-2002).  
22. See WTO, Understanding the WTO: Members and Observers,
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm (last visited Oct. 31, 2011). 
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The long-running banana dispute between the United States and the 
European Union resulted in the loss of preferential access that the European 
Union had extended to banana exports from African, Caribbean, and Pacific 
countries that are former colonies of EU member states. Brought by the 
United States, and making claims with respect to bananas produced in South 
America, the dispute is one of the longest-running (spanning 1993 to 
2010)23 and most seemingly intractable in the history of the World Trade 
Organization.  
The question was whether the preferential access given by EU member 
states to their former colonies violated the EU member states’ GATT 
obligations. And I guess I should give some background: These English-
speaking, Spanish-speaking, and French-speaking territories and countries 
were colonies of EU member states. Once they were given independence, 
part of the deal was: “we will continue to subsidize you, some might even 
argue compensate you or make reparations to you,   by giving your 
agricultural products preferential access to our markets.”   
The preferential arrangement between EU member states and their 
former colonies, between the European Union and those decolonized states, 
was found to be illegal. With respect to compliance, the European Union 
dragged its feet for a considerable period of time and, in May 2010, finally 
consented to comply with the panel report and the compliance panel. 
Some interesting facts with respect to the dispute include: (i) Bananas are 
a major agricultural crop in the Caribbean;24 (ii) the United States does not 
produce bananas; instead, the United States’ position represented the 
interests of large MNCs (i.e., Dole and Chiquita) who had interests in 
banana-producing South American countries (i.e., today’s banana 
republics); (iii) pursuant to WTO procedural rules and as a result of the 
procedural posture of the dispute, the African, Caribbean, and Pacific states 
and territories, whose market access and economic futures would be 
determined by the dispute, were limited to the role of third party observers.  
The case was brought by the United States against the European Union, 
not because the United States grows bananas, but because it was 
representing the interests of the multinational corporations—Dole and 
Chiquita for instance—which do have banana growing enterprises in Latin 
American countries. The problem, according to their point of view, was 
“our bananas are being disadvantaged in the European markets, they’re 
getting discriminatory treatment because the Caribbean, Pacific and African 
bananas are getting in at a lower rate and so are more attractive to 
consumers.” 
 23. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Regime for the Importation, 
Sale and Distribution of Bananas, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 9, 1997). 
 24. According to then-Prime Minister of Jamaica Percival J. Patterson, “Bananas are 
to us what cars are to Detroit.” WARREN J. KEEGAN & MARK C. GREEN, GLOBAL MARKETING
125 (2d ed. 2000). 
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As I have stated, the Caribbean states are members of the WTO. 
However, with respect to this decision which has enormous impact on a 
substantial part of their economy, these Caribbean states were reduced to 
the role of third party observers. That is, they were able to submit 
documents and relevant information, but they were not parties, they were 
not participants, they were not there as primary actors with respect to their 
economic future. Fifty-six of the seventy-eight nations in the ACP that were 
to be impacted by the banana settlement are members of the WTO, but were 
given no ability to make an impact on the WTO proceedings.25 The WTO 
dispute settlement procedures appear to present a threat to the sovereignty 
of member states—their ability to take necessary government actions on 
behalf of citizens.26 The WTO system as it stands leaves developing 
countries in a position where their participation is marginalized and they are 
not often a part of proceedings.27
D. WTO: European Union Sugar Subsidies Dispute 
In 2003, Australia, Brazil, and Thailand requested the establishment of a 
WTO panel to examine the legality of subsidies applied to European 
Communities’ (EC) sugar.28 As had occurred, with respect to bananas, the 
European Union’s sugar subsidies, challenged by Australia, Brazil, and 
Thailand, were found to be illegal. The Dispute Settlement Body’s 2004 
report, which found that the European Union’s sugar regime breached the 
European Union’s WTO obligations, had a detrimental impact on another 
major cash crop of African, Caribbean, and Pacific states and territories.29
As I stated earlier, the agricultural background of the islands means that 
sugar and bananas were crucial to their agricultural economy. I should also 
add, however, that the Caribbean sugar industry is extremely inefficient and 
25. Id.
 26. Benjamin L. Brimeyer, Bananas, Beef, and Compliance in the World Trade 
Organization: The Inability of the WTO Dispute Settlement Process to Achieve Compliance 
from Superpower Nations, 10 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 133, 167 (2001). 
 27. HAIDER A. KHAN & YIBEI LIU, GLOBALIZATION AND THE WTO DISPUTE 
SETTLEMENT MECHANISM: MAKING A RULES-BASED TRADING REGIME WORK, 23-24 (2008), 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/7613/1/WTO.PDF. The dispute was supposed to be just 
limited to bananas, but the European Union has insisted on expanding the package to 
encompass other concessions included in the Doha Round. GIOVANNI ANANIA, HOW WOULD 
THE WTO AGREEMENT ON BANANAS AFFECT EXPORTING AND IMPORTING COUNTRIES? 5
(International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development Programme on Agricultural 
Trade and Sustainable Development June 2009), available at
http://ictsd.org/downloads/2009/07/web_bananas.pdf. 
 28. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Export Subsidies on Sugar,
WT/DS265/AB/R, WT/DS266/AB/R, WT/DS283/AB/R (Apr. 28, 2005), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_viewerwindow.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocum
ents/t/WT/DS/283ABR.doc. 
 29. In those countries, sugar and bananas are huge agricultural products and in fact a 
substantial part of their economy. 
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unproductive  and later in this Essay I will address issues of comparative 
advantage as well. The fact that Caribbean states and territories would no 
longer get access to this market had a huge impact on the day-to-day life 
and domestic economies of those countries and on their economic 
sovereignty. The changes to the EU sugar regime have been described as 
drastic changes that will affect developing and least developed countries 
that depend on the preferential treatment received from the European 
Union.30
The new agreement for tariff-free sugar imports into the EU market did 
not fully come into effect until 2009, and the European Union seems to 
suggest that it will be beneficial for LDCs and the European Union alike.31
The new sugar regime stands to leave ACP countries as losers in the new 
market system if they are unable to compete with the comparative 
advantages other countries enjoy.32 The new regime changes the positions of 
those that are the winners and those that are the losers and threatens the 
already fragile economies of the losers.33 Although the new sugar regime 
has an impact on all ACP countries, the Caribbean countries stand out as 
greater losers in the newly competitive sugar market than other countries.34
E. WTO: Antigua-United States Gambling Dispute 
The internet gambling dispute between the United States and Antigua is 
historic in scope. It began with Antigua’s35 March 21, 2003 request for 
consultation under the WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding about 
United States barriers to the provision of transborder gambling services.36
 30. Piero Conforti & George Rapsomanikis, The Impact of the European Union 
Sugar Policy Reform on Developing and Least Developed Countries, in FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UN, COMMODITY MARKET REVIEW 89, 90-93 (2005), 
available at http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/a0334e/a0334e0f.htm. The author found through 
his research that it is not likely that the quantity of sugar exported from the Caribbean should 
decrease all that much but, rather, the revenues would be significantly different. The 
Caribbean has in fact decreased in both production and revenue from sugar. Id. at 103. 
 31. LEENA KERKELA & ELLEN HUAN-NIEMI, TRADE PREFERENCES IN THE EU SUGAR 
SECTOR: WINNERS AND LOSERS 8 (Purdue Univ. Seminar on Agric. 2005), available at
http://www.etsg.org/ETSG2005/papers/kerkela.pdf. 
 32. ELLEN HUAN-NIEMI & LEENA KERKELA, REFORM IN THE EU SUGAR REGIME:
IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL SUGAR MARKETS, 4-6 (2005), available at
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/24733/1/cp05hu02.pdf. 
33. Id. at 14. 
 34. Michael Bruntup, Discussion Paper, Everything But Arms (EBA) and the EU-
Sugar Market Reform—Development Gift or Trojan Horse? 7 (German Development 
Institute Oct. 2006), available at http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/ 
Detail/?ots591=0c54e3b3-1e9c-be1e-2c24-a6a8c7060233&lng=en&id=27650. 
 35. And I challenge you to find Antigua on your map—Antigua, it’s on the right 
hand side, it’s a very tiny twin-island state—Antigua and Barbuda . . .  
36. See Request for Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, United States—
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services—Request for 
Consultations by Antigua and Barbuda, WT/DS285/1 (Mar. 27, 2003), available at
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In light of the disparity in power in the WTO,37 I was very, very 
surprised in 2003 to learn that Antigua had challenged the United States 
about its internet gambling laws. That is, the United States had forbidden 
internet gambling, but Antigua had become a huge offshore internet 
gambling center—a huge business, with lots of companies going there to 
invest and locate their internet gambling sites in that country.  
In view of the conflict, Antigua challenged the United States, claiming 
that the prohibition violated the United States’ WTO obligations under the 
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) because it was possible to 
gamble in the United States in person via casinos, race tracks,  and various 
other state and private entity sponsored gambling. 
The dispute resulted in partial wins for Antigua under both the 
November 10, 2004 Panel Report and the April 7, 2005 Appellate Body 
report.38 However, the United States’ refusal to comply with the findings 
resulted in further proceedings to ensure compliance.39 Although the WTO 
can impose “special and different treatment” provisions to protect the 
http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_viewerwindow.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocum
ents/t/S/L/110.doc. 
 37. Kristin Bohl, Problems of Developing Country Access to WTO Dispute 
Settlement, 9 CHI. KENT J. INT’L & COMP. L. 130, 131 (2009). The reasons smaller states, like 
those in the Caribbean, have trouble with access to the system often include a lack of 
resources, small trade volumes, a lack of institutional capacity or a lack of political will. Id.
at 132. 
 38. Report of the Panel, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/R (Nov. 10, 2004), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/gen_searchResult.asp?RN=0&searchtype=browse&q1=%28
%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS285%FCR%2A+and+not+RW%2A%29&language=1; 
Report of the Appellate Body, United States—Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply 
of Gambling and Betting Services, WT/DS285/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2005), available at
http://docsonline.wto.org/imrd/gen_searchResult.asp?RN=0&searchtype=browse&q1=%28
%40meta%5FSymbol+WT%FCDS285%FCAB%FCR%2A+and+not+RW%2A%29&langua
ge=1. The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA) was passed as a 
result of the United States losing in its WTO dispute against Antigua and Barbuda. Peter 
Shaker, America’s Bad Bet: How the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 
Will Hurt the House, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 1183, 1198 (2007).  
 39. Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Antigua and Barbuda, United States—
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services 
WT/DS285/RW (Mar. 30, 2007), available at http://docsonline.wto.org/GEN_viewer 
window.asp?http://docsonline.wto.org:80/DDFDocuments/t/WT/DS/285RW-00.doc. The 
initial reaction by Antigua to the favorable ruling was that the win was a great victory, 
especially for such a little country. Daniel Pruzin, Antigua-Barbuda Wins WTO Interim 
Ruling Against U.S. Internet Gambling Restrictions, 21 Int’l. Trade Rep. (BNA) 13, 14 (Mar. 
25, 2004). However, some scholars still feel that the victory was hollow because the case 
“highlights the ineffectiveness of the provisions intended to ensure that developing countries 
are able to use and prevail during the WTO dispute settlement process.” Id. at 28. The fact of 
the matter is that the Antigua has very little it can do to impose sanctions against the United 
States Daniel B. Pimlott, WTO Rules Against U.S. in Internet Gambling Case, FIN. TIMES 
(London), Jan. 26, 2007, available at http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/317e9e48-ad61-11db-
8709-0000779e2340.html#axzz1dBYdeTQQ. 
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interests of developing countries from developed countries, the measures 
have been critiqued for rarely being implemented and even more rarely 
being to the benefit of developing countries.40 Even when measures are 
taken, the WTO does not have any teeth to make the United States adhere to 
rulings against developing countries: even after two adverse WTO rulings, 
the United States still refused to change its position on Antigua and internet 
gambling and continued to try to make internet gambling illegal.41
As a result of the compliance proceedings, on December 23, 2007 the 
WTO arbitrator authorized Antigua to assert $21 million nullification of 
benefits against U.S. intellectual property that was protected pursuant to the 
TRIPS Agreement.42 That is, Antigua was given permission to violate the 
TRIPs with respect to U.S. intellectual property up to the amount of $21 
million without violating its obligations under the WTO Agreement.43 The 
United States’ response was to announce that it was withdrawing from its 
GATS obligations as they pertained to internet gambling.44
 40. Amin Alavi, On the (Non)-Effectiveness of the World Trade Organization’s 
Special and Different Treatments in the Dispute Settlement Process, 41 J. WORLD TRADE
319, 320 (Apr. 2007). 
41. See Andrea Ewart, Small Developing States in the WTO: A Procedural Approach 
to Special and Differential Treatment through Reforms to Dispute Settlement, 35 SYRACUSE 
J. INT’L L. & COM. 27, 55 (2007). 
 42. The WTO ruling was a potentially significant move by the WTO in favor of 
small countries because Antigua was permitted to suspend $21 million annually in IP rights 
held by firms from the United States See Isaac Wohl, The Antigua-United States Online 
Gambling Dispute, 4 J. INT’L COMM. & ECON. 1, 2-3 (2009). This remedy was chosen by the 
WTO because a remedy allowing suspension of obligations to the US would have almost no 
effect in a developed country such as the United States Clint Bodien, Cross-Retaliation in the 
WTO: Antigua and Barbuda’s Proposed Remedy against the United States in an Online 
Gambling, 14 L. & BUS. REV. AM. 847, 853 (2008). The ruling gives small countries the 
potential to create leverage in future disputes. Wohl, supra, at 16. The decision was 
especially notable because it was an instance where the 15th smallest country in the world 
went head to head with the world’s economic superpower and left the WTO with a sound 
victory. Ewart, supra note 41, at 27. 
 43. The suspension of IP rights of U.S. firms was notable because the WTO DSB 
recognized that traditional remedies would not likely be enforceable because of the disparity 
in size of the countries. Bodien, supra note 42, at 855. However, Antigua could also lose its 
MFN status with the United States via the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) because the CBI 
includes a requirement of recognition and enforcement of U.S. IP rights as one of the 
requirements for the MFN status. Id. at 855. The bottom line is that the DSB’s decision could 
have ended up being more detrimental than beneficial for Antigua. Id.
 44. Yevgeniya Roysen, Taking Chances: The United States’ Policy on Internet 
Gambling and Its International Implications, 26 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 873, 875 (2008-
2009). On April 15th, 2011, the FBI indicted 11 of the founders from the three largest online 
poker websites and shut down the websites. Michael McCarthy, FBI Busts Three Biggest 
Online Poker Hhouses, USA TODAY, (Apr. 16, 2011), available at
http://content.usatoday.com/communities/gameon/post/2011/04/fbi-cracks-down-on-3-
biggest-online-poker-houses-poker-stars-full-tilt-poker-absolute-poker/1. The indictees were 
charged with bank fraud, money laundering, and illegal gambling offenses. Id. The 
prosecutors cited the UIGEA as the grounds for the indictments. Id. Until the very recent 
indictments, the WTO decision had left the operators of the online gambling websites unsure 
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I would ask you to think about the effect or the benefit of this $21
million of IP nullification to Antigua. That is, I am able to violate your 
intellectual property rights up to the amount of $21 million versus having an 
economy or an industry that actually functions and employs Antiguan 
citizens and brings in tax revenue to the state. Furthermore, the fact that a 
small nation won against an economic superpower, yet ultimately still lost, 
only emphasizes the flaws in the WTO system: Developed countries 
essentially do what they like, regardless of their commitments to the 
WTO.45
F. EU-CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement 
The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) is the premier Caribbean 
regional integration organization.46 Founded in 1973, the organization first 
consisted of Anglophone former colonies of the United Kingdom. 
Membership has expanded to include Haiti. CARIFORUM is a broader 
organization that includes the Dominican Republic. 
Following the WTO proceedings in the banana wars, in view of the need 
to re-arrange the economic and trade relationship between the EU member 
states and their former ACP colonies, the European Union entered into 
economic partnership agreements with different regional groupings of 
African, Caribbean, and Pacific former colonies. Broadly, pursuant to the 
terms of the CARIFORUM Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA), access 
to the EU markets is no longer unconditional: Products of the 
CARIFORUM states will receive duty-free and quota-free access to the 
markets of EU member states. In return, products from EU member states 
will face decreasing barriers to the markets of the Dominican Republic and 
CARICOM member states. CARIFORUM states have agreed to liberalize 
80 percent of imports over 15 years and will liberalize the remaining 20 
percent over 20 to 25 years.47
of the legality of their activities. Tom Newnham, Note, WTO Case Study: United States—
Measures Affecting the Cross-Border Supply of Gambling and Betting Services, 7 ASPER 
REV. INT’L BUS. & TRADE L. 77, 81 (2007). The constitutionality of UIGEA was challenged 
in 2008 by a non-profit advocacy group, but the case was dismissed in an unpublished 
opinion. Kristina L. Perry, Note, Current State of the Unlawful Internet Gambling 
Enforcement Act and Recently Adopted Prohibition on Funding of Unlawful Internet 
Gambling, 8 RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & BUS. 29, 31 (2008-2009). The court did not state whether 
the dismissal was based on a lack of standing or for failure to state a claim. Id.
 45. Michael Grunfeld, Note, Don’t Bet on the United States’s Internet Gambling 
Laws: The Tension between Internet Gambling Legislation and World Trade Organization 
Commitments, 2007 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 439, 501-03 (2007). 
 46. For a thorough discussion of CARICOM, see Bravo, CARICOM, supra note 4, at 
167-89. 
47. See Anthony Gomes, Phasing of Tariff Liberalization on European Union 
Goods, JAMAICA OBSERVER, Jan. 26, 2011, available at
http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/columns/Phasing-of-tariff-liberalisation-on-European-
Union-goods_8315707#ixzz1DrRgSCn3. 
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What does it mean? What are the terms of the deal? Access to the EU 
markets is no longer unconditional. So, the good deal that the former 
colonies had was that their preferential access to EU markets was not 
reciprocal. That is, the Caribbean states and territories got preferential 
access but could still keep their tariffs and get revenue from the European 
Union’s products coming in. Now it’s no longer unconditional, so the 
products of the CARIFORUM states will get duty free and quota free access 
to the EU markets but, in return, tariffs must be removed with respect to 80 
percent of imports over 15 years and the remaining 20 percent over a 20 to 
25 year period.  
Arrived at following four years of negotiation, the treaty is 
controversial48 and has stimulated much debate in the region regarding 
whether the economic effects will be beneficial for the Caribbean. For 
example, the loss of tariff revenues will be substantial: Based on data for the 
2005/06 fiscal period, at the end of the liberalization period Jamaica is 
estimated to lose approximately $1.34 billion in both tariff and non-tariff 
revenues, or 96 percent of tariff revenues previously collected from EU 
imports.49
So, having finally acceded to the banana dispute resolution, the European 
Union negotiates with its former colonies to come into compliance with its 
WTO obligations. Through the CARIFORUM Economic Partnership 
Agreement, the European Union is attempting to rearrange its relationship 
with those colonies so that it comes into compliance. However, freed finally 
by its decision to comply with the banana decision, the European Union’s 
negotiations are no longer premised on the idea of giving unconditional aid 
to its colonies. Now we can bargain hard because we have been told that 
this preferential access violates our WTO obligations, right? 
Despite the agreement, the Caribbean continues to resist implementation. 
There’s the promising and then the complying.50  So, the agreement was 
 48. I can’t tell you how many editorials were published in the papers in the 
Caribbean Islands in which dire predictions have been made regarding what will be the effect 
of this agreement, or whether the CARICOM and Dominican Republic should have held out 
for a better deal or some other kind of deal with the European Union because this, they said, 
would be the end of the region. See, e.g., Rickey Singh, ‘EPA Nightmare,’ JAMAICA 
OBSERVER, Sept. 8, 2008, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/139937_-EPA-nightmare-. 
49. See Gomes, supra note 47. 
 50. In response to the lack of implementation of the EPA by Caribbean countries, 
CARIFORUM has agreed that it will establish an “EPA Implementation Unit” by July of 
2011. Dixie-Ann Dickson, EPA Implementation Unit Coming in July Says Cadiz, TRINIDAD 
GUARDIAN (Trinidad & Tobago), Apr. 4, 2011, http://guardian.co.tt/business/2011/04/04/epa-
implementation-unit-coming-july-says-cadiz. It seems like one of the biggest obstacles to 
implementing this for Caribbean countries has been getting local business to be comfortable 
with the changes. Id. Cariforum is using information seminars aimed at local business 
owners and the European Union’s offer of aid for trade and the promise to offer technologies 
as an incentive for local businesses that are reluctant to get on board with the EPA. Id. The 
stresses from the outside to adjust their economies have caused stresses within. Although the 
countries within the region have many similarities, there are rivalries and social differences 
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signed at the end of 2008 and was supposed to come in effect on January 1, 
of this year—2011. As of late February 2011, only Guyana51 had 
implemented the agreement. Further, it took two years before the regional 
body, CARICOM, set up an implementation body to ensure member state 
compliance with the treaty.   
III. IMPLICATIONS FOR CARIBBEAN ECONOMIC SOVEREIGNTY
What do these series of events reveal about the economic sovereignty of 
the states and territories of the Caribbean? Individually and collectively, 
they demonstrate that Caribbean states and territories lack economic 
sovereignty and are thus unable to chart their own economic destiny. I 
would say that their situation is very similar to the situation of other small 
and micro states that do not have economic heft. Their market is not that 
attractive, they do not have enough population or economic activity to bring 
in investors and investments from abroad, so they are left to react rather 
than to create their own initiatives. The effects of these challenges will be 
adverse impacts on their major agricultural industries, which as I noted 
before, are quite inefficient. As a result of the OECD’s anti-tax haven and 
anti-money laundering initiatives, their provision of financial and 
recreational services has now been adversely impacted as well. 
It is not hyperbole to state that the economic sovereignty challenges call 
into question the viability of fundamental tenets of international trade law. 
The challenges that I have described have adversely impacted the region’s 
major agricultural industries. The region’s rather successful turn toward the 
provision of financial and recreational services was negatively impacted by 
the OECD’s anti-tax haven and anti-money laundering efforts. The 
provision of the more “innocuous” recreational services (gambling) by some 
states and territories has been stymied. The region must now continue its 
search for the next comparative advantage. But will that comparative 
advantage be deemed acceptable by the international community’s 
regulatory organizations? 
which make integrating further more difficult. David Jessop, Op-Ed., Caricom’s Problems 
Create Doubts for Partners, DOMINICAN TODAY (Dominican Republic), Apr. 8, 2011, 
http://www.dominicantoday.com/dr/opinion/2011/4/8/39188/Caricoms-problems-create-
doubts-for-partners. The rivalries between islands may not be overcome quickly enough to 
implement effective coalitions for economic growth.  
 51. And I also meant to say I apologize because my map does not show Guyana. 
Guyana is actually on the South American continent but is considered to be in the Caribbean 
by Anglophones in the Caribbean based on historical ties. Caribbean countries are well 
behind in implementing their EPA obligations on tariff dismantlement; the deadline was the 
beginning of the year, and thus far only Guyana and St. Kitts Nevis have met their 
obligations. Id. The lack of uniformity and agreement between Caribbean countries seems 
likely to lead to greater questions being raised about the purpose of such regional 
organizations. Id.
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In the context of evaluating the impact of these challenges, let’s think 
about comparative advantage now. What is “comparative advantage?” 
Pursuant to the theory of comparative advantage, a state should produce and 
trade in the products and services in which it has a comparative advantage 
in comparison to the other products and services that it could produce. That 
is, you should do what you’re best at, right? And trade what you’re best at 
producing.  
Comparative advantage is impermanent. Each trading partner must be 
endlessly flexible and must continuously engage in formulating and 
exploring new sources or formats of its comparative advantage. The 
Caribbean region’s transition from the provision of agricultural products to 
the provision of varied services—tourism, financial, recreational (i.e., 
gambling)—demonstrates the impermanence of comparative advantage. At 
one point, they were the best, or at least good, at banana and sugar 
production; now they are very good at tourism services, right?52 But also 
several are very good at financial services and banking. Think of 
transitioning from the purely agricultural model to the financial services and 
banking model and even to the more or less innocuous internet gambling 
model.  
The transition to their next comparative advantage would be facilitated 
by their exercise of economic sovereignty by creating a regulatory regime 
attractive to those who want to park their money here, escape taxes there, or 
play and gamble on the internet. However, this process of transition has 
been foreclosed or substantially restricted by the top-down imposition of 
regulations by a non-representative—I would claim a non-representative—
international body—the OECD. That is, the region’s search for a new 
comparative advantage has been undermined to a great extent so that the 
movement away from agriculture to another kind of paradigm—searching 
for the services industry that these countries would be very suited for—has 
not been completed at this point, or is being stultified.  
According to the theory of comparative advantage, the WTO trading 
partners or parties need to be very flexible in finding what their comparative 
advantage is going to be. The Caribbean may also demonstrate that 
sovereignty itself—the power to create regulatory regimes within a territory 
or state—may be a source of comparative advantage. They seem to have 
found a comparative advantage that consists of using sovereignty itself to 
create regulatory regimes that would facilitate economic activity and 
economic access for their citizens. 
Yet sovereignty itself is an uncertain source of comparative advantage 
since it is constricted and shrinking in scope due to multilateral treaties, 
geopolitical realities, and other commitments.  
What is the impact of large-country policies, which may stem from anti-
competitive intent and have anti-competitive impact, in undermining the 
 52. Thus, the Caribbean as a favored destination for Spring Break. 
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search for comparative advantage by the less powerful? Will comparative 
advantage of weaker states only be explored at the discretion of and 
pursuant to the terms agreed to by larger economies? 
Yet that reality—a top-down imposition of rules of indeterminate 
legitimacy—is detrimental to both the United States and the Caribbean. For 
example, the decrease in banana production in the region has led to an 
increase in production of marijuana and an increased role in provision of 
illicit transborder services. Drug trafficking is now the most viable and 
productive economic activity for the dislocated banana or sugar farmer and 
for others dependent on the banana industry. 
What might be the region’s comparative advantage—proximity to the 
United States or the possession of Anglophone populations in a world where 
English is predominant? Anything else? Do these small countries and 
territories actually have anything to offer in a globalized world? Anything 
other than white or golden powdery beaches, tropical climates, and endless 
sunshine?  
Further analysis of the meaning of these challenges to Caribbean 
sovereignty can be organized under several banners: (1) the interaction of 
sovereignty and membership; (2) sovereignty and legitimacy; (3) 
sovereignty and illicit trade; and (4) sovereignty, size, and power 
imbalances. 
A. Sovereignty and Membership 
Does membership in multilateral organizations confer sovereignty 
enhancing benefits? The circumstances of the affected Caribbean states and 
territories starkly demonstrate an inability to effectively participate in 
situations of both membership and non-membership: Contrast the 
challenges presented by the OECD anti-tax haven and anti-money 
laundering initiatives with the challenges arising from the results of the 
sugar, banana, and gambling disputes under the auspices of the WTO. That 
is, Caribbean state membership in the WTO does not appear to have 
conferred any significant benefit to the Caribbean states with respect to 
resolution of these disputes. The states and territories were subjected to the 
OECD anti-tax haven and anti-money laundering initiatives despite non-
membership in either the OECD or the FATF. Yet, as members of the 
WTO, in the sugar and banana disputes, they were limited to 3rd party 
observer status despite the fundamental importance of the outcomes of both 
of those disputes to their economic health and futures. With respect to the 
gambling dispute, the small size and lack of economic and political power 
of Antigua was not overcome by its membership in the WTO. Instead, the 
United States was able to ignore and/or refuse compliance with the panel 
and Appellate Body reports, with no adverse economic or other effects on 
the United States. In contrast, the Antigua offshore gambling industry was 
virtually destroyed.  
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The result is the same. As a member with a voice in the WTO, a 
Caribbean state or territory is foreclosed with respect to the dispute central 
to its economy just as they were foreclosed from participation due to the 
membership requirements with respect to the OECD. Once the more 
powerful economies have identified a threat to their own regulatory 
regime—that is, here are our own tax dollars fleeing elsewhere or here are 
potential havens for money laundering—they determine that reform is 
needed. Their influence means that they are able to force these targeted 
countries to change their internal domestic regulations. So there was no 
difference. Whether there was membership or not, the outcome was the 
same: loss of market, loss of control, and demonstration of powerlessness 
against larger economic powers. 
However, note that with respect to Caribbean states’ membership in 
CARICOM, those states have manifested great skittishness with respect to 
their membership obligations, and a general reluctance to pool membership, 
leading to a largely ineffective organization.53 Note, as well, other 
manifestation of sovereign prerogative: lack of implementation with respect 
to the CARIFORUM-EU Partnership Agreement.54
My question is, if there is no value, or little value, to sovereignty, what is 
the point of participation, of voice, of access, of whether you are a member 
or a nonmember in these international institutions? Contrasting the impact 
of the OECD anti-tax haven and anti-money laundering regime and the 
effects of the WTO bananas, sugar, and internet gambling dispute, it seems 
to me that having membership in those international organizations was 
virtually meaningless for these countries. What will sovereignty become for 
these little places, these micro places? These places, these micro states, may 
seem to be inconsequential, to be far away, or great for a Spring Break 
vacation, but we are globalized and interlinked; there is a deep 
interrelationship. Accessing drugs or accessing the drug market in the 
United States coming through the Caribbean is much more possible now 
when legitimate economic activity is foreclosed for the individual citizens 
in Jamaica. 
B. Sovereignty and Illicit Trade  
I also want to think about the larger, detrimental impact when the search 
for comparative advantage is undermined in this way. I have thought a great 
deal about the comparative advantage of Caribbean countries; that is, the 
movement away from agriculture to tourism. I think it is clear that tourism 
is going to employ a certain number of people but not everyone or even a 
majority of the population. So, self-sustaining agriculture would seem to be 
53. See generally, Bravo, CARICOM, supra note 4. 
54. See discussion supra, Part II.6. 
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a good project. But now, bananas are no longer profitable; it makes no sense 
to grow bananas. It makes no sense to grow sugar.  
Does anyone know what the number one cash crop is now in the 
Caribbean? Marijuana. That is, if I can’t grow bananas and find a market for 
it, and I can’t get a job at the resort, and I can’t be involved in a licit 
economic industry, I may then explore the relationship between the 
legitimate trade links and the illicit or illegitimate trade links. The choice to 
that banana farmer is to find the next comparative advantage. Proximity to 
the United States is a source of comparative advantage, and the felicity of 
being English-speaking in a world where English is the dominant world 
language of business and economics is also another source of comparative 
advantage. The reality of being shut out from legitimate international 
markets—sugar, bananas—has resulted in a huge spike in the production of 
marijuana, and provision of illicit services—the transborder shipment is 
drugs—services that are not covered under the General Agreement on Trade 
in Services or other WTO agreements or instruments. 
What is the effect of that move to illicit business on the sovereignty of 
these states? The last time that Jamaica actually hit the news in the United 
States in a big way was the embarrassing scenario last year where a certain 
drug don called Dudus faced an extradition request from the United States. 
Curiously enough, the drug don lived in the constituency of the Prime 
Minister of Jamaica. Curiously enough, someone in the government of 
Jamaica contacted a high flying and high priced law firm in Washington, 
D.C. to fight the extradition on the basis of sovereignty—the sovereignty of 
the Jamaican state, the nation state. When this news broke in Jamaica, there 
was outrage that Jamaican laws were being used to defend the alleged drug 
king pin, but there was also great denial on the part of the government: 
denial of involvement. The governmental systems appeared to be corrupted, 
with some participation of the Prime Minister, Bruce Golding.55 In fact, as 
we meet and speak here in Lansing, Michigan, the Manatt Commission of 
Inquiry is underway in Kingston, Jamaica, attempting to identify the 
existence and source of corruption in the system and the reasons why 
Jamaica first refused to extradite Mr. Christopher Coke (or Dudus), the 
infamous drug lord.56
55. See Paul Henry, Golding Maintains that Manatt Did not work for Government,
JAMAICA OBSERVER, Mar. 2, 2011, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/-Golding-
maintains-that-Manatt-did-not-work-for-Gov-t; Marc Lacey, U.S. Extradition Effort Strains 
Relationship with Jamaica, N.Y. TIMES , Apr. 25, 2010,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/world/americas/26jamaica.html?ref=christophercoke. 
56. See Tanesha Mundle, Nelson Denies Saying Coke Extradition Could Topple 
Government, JAMAICA OBSERVER, Feb. 18, 2011, http://www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/I-
never-uttered-such-words_8388676. Joseph Goldstein, Jamaican Kingpin Pleads Guilty in 
New York, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2011, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/01/nyregion/christopher-coke-pleads-guilty-in-new-
york.html?_r=1&ref=christophercoke. 
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Sovereignty then was being used as a banner, as a protective shield, for 
an accused drug trafficker. That was the argument, we’re not going to 
extradite because it violates our sovereignty that the United States wants us 
to extradite this person, used as a shield for illicit activities, right? So, 
Jamaica experienced an island-wide manhunt for this individual57 at the 
same time that the government was trying to fight his extradition based on 
notions of the sovereignty of the Jamaican state.  
C. Sovereignty and Legitimacy 
I also want to think about sovereignty and legitimacy, to question the 
legitimacy of the top-down creation and implementation of standards by the 
OECD. The United Nations is like sausage making: everyone goes in and 
speaks, and no one can come to a decision. With the FATF, in contrast, you 
have a single purpose, exclusive membership organization. You can actually 
create rules. But to what extent are these rules then being used to facilitate 
the economic development of one set of countries versus the domination of 
smaller, less powerful states?  
What is the source, if any, of the legitimacy of the anti-money laundering 
and anti-tax haven initiatives of the OECD and the FATF, both of which are 
limited—even exclusive—membership and limited-purpose economic 
institutions? That is, what is the source of the standards deployed? What is 
the nature of the participation of the “subjects” of these rules? Did the 
subjects—”sovereign states”—participate in crafting them? Despite the 
doubts regarding legitimacy of the power exercised by the organizations, 
there is no doubt regarding the effectiveness of their strategies supported, as 
they are, by the power of the largest trading economies.  
D. Sovereignty, Size, and Power Imbalances: More about Legitimacy  
Caribbean states and territories are small in size and lack resources. As a 
result, their ability to participate effectively in multilateral organizations is 
negatively impacted.58    
In addition, the Caribbean states’ and territories’ responses to the 
economic challenges manifest an inability to withstand reputational 
pressures. Despite protestations about the legitimacy—both with respect to 
the source of the standards and the discriminatory application—and 
purposes of the OECD anti-tax haven and OECD/FATF anti-money 
laundering initiatives, all the Caribbean states and territories capitulated to 
 57. Kareem Fahim, Gang Leader Still Eludes Police as Death Rate Rises, N.Y.
TIMES, May 27, 2010,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/28/world/americas/28jamaica.html?ref=christophercoke. 
 58. Note, however, that members of CARICOM have devised an institutional 
mechanism for pooling negotiation strategies—the CARICOM Regional Negotiation 
Machinery. 
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the pressures, as did all other targets of the FATF. Their capitulation must 
be contrasted to the reactions of the United States and the European Union 
to the outcomes of the beef hormones and gambling disputes.59 Economic 
and other sources of power allowed both of these players to avoid effective 
implementation of ostensibly neutral rules. 
And then there is the question of sovereignty and size. Should we have 
small states? Does it make sense? What does sovereignty entail if there will 
be an inability to actually carve a path in the increasingly interdependent 
world? What function does sovereignty provide for these entities? It is nice 
to have the flag and the athletes at the Olympic Games and various cultural 
things, but does it really provide for the economic benefit, the political 
benefit of the citizens of that territory or geographic space?  
CONCLUSIONS
The recent challenges to Caribbean economic sovereignty give rise to a 
number of questions. These are: Does membership in multilateral 
organizations confer benefits to small states? Or does the membership of 
such states help to facilitate paralysis in decision-making? For example, the 
WTO’s Doha Round paralysis stems from the attempt to give voice to “too 
many” points of view, while at the same time illustrating the limits of 
participatory democracy. Does the contrast between the “effectiveness” of 
the FATF’s standard-setting and implementation with the WTO’s decision-
making and standard-setting challenges demonstrate the need for the raw 
exercise of political power in international relations and law? 
Secondly, the challenges demonstrate the effects of power disparities—
both with respect to geographic and population size as well as to economic 
size and influence.  
Thirdly, this examination of those challenges calls into question the 
legitimacy and impact of limited member international organizations. Do 
they merely manifest the existing power disparities such that they are tools 
and exemplars of the disparities in power? And what is the impact when 
power disparities and the exercise of power by the powerful shut out the 
smaller states from legitimate trade? Jamaica, and the Caribbean in general, 
appears to illustrate the assumption of the reins of state power by illicit 
transborder networks.  
In those cases, the fiction of the juridical equality of states becomes, 
itself, a source of comparative advantage for the pursuit of illicit and illegal 
activities. That is, as the illegal and illicit take over the economy, the state’s 
sovereign status becomes a shield against scrutiny and the implementation 
of an internationally-based rule of law. 
 59. Appellate Body Report, European Communities—Measures Concerning Meat 
and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998). 
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A further question arises whether the pooling of sovereignty continues to 
be a good choice. Membership of multilateral organizations may hold out 
the benefits of access to previously negotiated bargains and voice within an 
organization, even if the strength and influence of that voice is hindered by 
the reality of limited resources. However, decentralization and a refusal to 
join and to pool sovereignty may facilitate heterogeneity—that is, by 
serving to limit the spread and implementation of economic theories and 
projects that enjoy core/fundamental support in the West, but which may 
not serve the interests of smaller, weaker, more peripheral regions and 
economies. 
